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1 
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1 
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization 
dedicated to addressing the needs and interests of 
people aged fifty and older. AARP has a long history 
of advocating for access to affordable health care and 
for controlling costs without compromising quality. 
Affordable prescription medication is particularly 
important to the older population which, because of 
its higher rates of chronic and serious health 
conditions, has the highest rate of prescription drug 
use. Persons over sixty-five, although only thirteen 
percent of the population, account for thirty-four 
percent of all prescriptions dispensed and forty-two 
cents of every dollar spent on prescription drugs. 
Families USA, Cost Overdose: Growth in Drug 
Spending for the Elderly, 1992-2010 at 2 (July 2000). 
Significantly, in a 2005 AARP survey, one in four 
Americans 50+ who took a prescription drug in the 
past five years said they did not fill a prescription 
written by their doctor in the past two years. Cost 
was reported as the main deterrent. Linda L. 
Barrett, Ph.D., AARP, Prescription Drug Use Among 
Midlife and Older Americans (2005), available at 
assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/rx_midlife_plus.pdf. 
Since prescription drug spending has skyrocketed 
over the last decade and a half, and national health 
1   In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae 
state that: (1) no counsel to a party authored this brief, in 
whole or in part; and (2) no person or entity, other than amici, 
their members and counsel have made a monetary contribution 
to the preparation or submission of this brief.  The written 
consents of the parties to the filing of this brief have been filed 
with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
37.3. 
2 
expenditures on prescription drugs have quadrupled, 
AARP advocates for broader access to prescription 
drugs and lower prescription drug costs for 
consumers. See e.g., AARP, Rx Watchdog Report, 
May 2010, available at http://www.aarp.org/health/ 
drugs-supplements/rx_watchdog.html. 
The National Legislative Association on 
Prescription Drug Prices is a nonpartisan, nonprofit 
organization of state legislators from across the 
country who advocate for lowering prescription drug 
costs and increasing access to affordable medicines.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should refuse to apply the First 
Amendment to Vermont’s Prescription 
Confidentiality Law based on two essential facts. 
First, the regulation at issue is limited to the 
commercial use or private-channel distribution of 
confidential data. It is thus governed by cases of this 
Court upholding the regulation of uses of 
information in purely private settings that do not 
inform or contribute to the public sphere. Bartnicki 
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 n.10 (2001); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985).  Second, it concerns the regulation of
secondary uses of information where the government
requires the initial disclosure. It is thus governed by
cases in which this Court has affirmed a right of
governments to restrict access to government held or
mandated information. L.A. Police Dept. v. United
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). This
3 
Court has never held that a regulation at the 
intersection of these two lines of cases – where 
private channel exchanges and uses of private 
(government-mandated) records are at issue – is 
First Amendment protected “speech.” Cf. Reno v. 
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).  The First Circuit, in a 
case parallel to the one before the Court now, 
decided the issue correctly – the private-channel use 
and trade of prescription records is economic 
conduct, not “speech.”  IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 
550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
2864 (2009). 
If this law were evaluated as regulating First 
Amendment protected speech, such speech should be 
given protection commensurate with its “nugatory 
informational value.” Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52. In 
contrast, this Court should recognize the overriding 
interests of Vermont and other states in regulating 
the confidentiality of prescription records. The 
Vermont law directly advances its interest in 
protecting against disclosure of records containing 
the most personal of information as well as its 
interest in protecting individual autonomy in 
decision making on important personal matters. 
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. __ (2011); Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589 (1977). Protecting the confidentiality of 
records advances important goals of our health 
system, including combating undue influence of in-
person pharmaceutical marketing that raises costs 
and damages public health interests.  See Ohralik v. 







I. DATA MINING COMPANIES LACK A 
FREE SPEECH INTEREST IN ACCESS 
TO PRESCRIPTION RECORDS. 
 
The ultimate aim of the First Amendment is 
to support and promote public speech that creates a 
marketplace of ideas and contributes to the creation 
of opinions that aid self-government. In furtherance 
of this purpose, accurate and non-misleading 
commercial speech that informs the public sphere is 
deserving of a limited degree of First Amendment 
protection. But extension of that protection to the 
use of prescription records to target marketing to 
doctors is inappropriate for two reasons. First, the 
information in this case is never delivered to 
consumers or the public sphere and therefore does 
not further the informational function the 
commercial speech doctrine is meant to serve. 
Second, the information Respondents seek to access 
and use is not willingly released by the original 
holders of the information, but rather is contained in 
government mandated records. Vermont’s law to 
prevent the closed commercial uses of confidential 
information in records it requires the production of 
harms no First Amendment protected purpose.  
A. Respondents’ Conduct Does Not 
Serve a Public Informational 
Function. 
The court below erred in applying the exacting 
standards reserved for regulation of public 





Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), to the 
closed commercial trade and use of confidential 
medical information from prescriptions to target 
marketing.  
 
Respondents do not seek a right to disclose 
any information in their public advertising. They 
seek access to confidential records to track doctors 
and patients, not to communicate with them. 
Respondents use prescription records as a “targeting 
tool” to identify doctors that are most susceptible to 
sales messages and to evaluate whether they 
respond more positively to different tactics such as 
gifts, meals, samples and paid speaker programs. 
Pet. Br. at 9. The data allows pinpoint tracking of 
prescriptions for 200 million patients so that email 
alerts can be sent to a sales representative if a 
patient fills a prescription for a competing or generic 
drug. Id. at 8-9.2 And the data is used to monitor 
sales quotas and compensate sales representatives 
for their success at increasing market share on a 
physician by physician basis. Id. at 9. None of the 
activities communicate with consumers or the 
general public and therefore none are speech 
protected by the First Amendment. 
 
Modern First Amendment doctrine accords 
accurate and non-misleading commercial advertising 
a lesser degree of protection to serve an 
“informational function.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 
at 563. This function of contributing accurate and 
                                            
2  As described more fully in Section II, below, patients are 
identified and tracked by the records despite their names 





non-misleading information to the public sphere is 
valued because of its potential relation to core First 
Amendment purposes: “the free flow of commercial 
information” may be “indispensable to the formation 
of intelligent opinions” necessary for enlightened 
“public decision making in a democracy.” Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Credit 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); see First 
Nat’l Bank v. Bollotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (“the 
First Amendment goes beyond protection of . . . the 
self expression of individuals to prohibit government 
from limiting the stock of information from which 
members of the public may draw”). 
 
The protection of speech for its information 
function is primarily concerned with “public speech.” 
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 n. 7. Such speech 
contributes to the “free trade in ideas” that Justice 
Holmes described as “the best test of truth.” Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). But commercial purchases and uses of 
information in purely private commercial settings 
contributes few raw materials to the public sphere 
while at the same time being less subject to the 
cleansing power of the marketplace of ideas. Thus, 
the commercial speech doctrine allows more state 
regulation designed to thwart potentially misleading 
speech the more the communication in question 
takes place outside of the light of public debate. See 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. 
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (explaining that 
more regulation is permitted of in-person solicitation 
than of print advertising because the latter “poses 





because it is “more conducive to reflection and the 
exercise of choice on the part of the consumer than is 
personal solicitation”).  
 
Commercial use of information that does not 
communicate with consumers is not speech protected 
by the First Amendment. The Court opined in 
Ohralik, for instance, that there are “[n]umerous 
examples . . . of communications that are regulated 
without offending the First Amendment,” listing 
several examples of commercial communication not 
made to consumers or the public: “the exchange of 
information about securities, corporate proxy 
statements, the exchange of price and production 
information among competitors, and employers' 
threats of retaliation for the labor activities of 
employees.” 436 U.S. at 456. Similarly, the Court in 
Bartnicki distinguished between the section of a law 
prohibiting the “naked disclosure” of intercepted 
communications, which it held to be “pure speech,” 
and the “use” of that same information to chart 
commercial strategy or other commercial purposes, 
which the court held to be “conduct.” 532 U.S. at 526-
27. The difference between the disclosure held to be 
pure speech and the uses held to be conduct is their 
relation to the First Amendment purpose of informing 
the public sphere. The development and evaluation of 
commercial products and strategies, although they 
may be related to and intertwined with public 
advertising, are not themselves communication to the 
public. The First Amendment does not protect every 
activity that may shape a commercial advertising 
message – it only protects the message itself.  See 





Island, 418 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that 
franchise law limitation of corporate relations for 
“provision of advertising services” regulated conduct, 
not speech). 
 
The regulated activity of Respondents in this 
case uses information in ways that neither serve the 
public informative interests of the First Amendment, 
nor is policed by the open scrutiny of public 
examination. The Respondents do not seek a right to 
share this information with consumers – either 
doctors or patients. Rather they seek a right to use 
the information to target marketing. The messages 
in targeted marketing appeals deserve more limited 
First Amendment protection than those in more 
diffused forms of advertising. See Florida Bar v. 
Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 630 (1995) (“an 
untargeted letter to society at large is different in 
kind” from an individually targeted solicitation). But 
the use of information to create the targeted lists 
themselves deserves no First Amendment protection 
at all. See Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy 
and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1149, 
1165-82, 1190 (2005); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues 
of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 Duke L. J. 967 (2004); Julie 
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy 
and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 
1414 (2000) (arguing against heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny for regulation of the trade of 
personal data as “a tool for processing people” rather 
9 
than as a “vehicle for injecting communication into 
the ‘marketplace of ideas’”).3  
Respondents go beyond the commercial speech 
doctrine, arguing that they are “publishers” that 
deserve protection for their activity equivalent to 
that due for the Wall Street Journal’s publication of 
stock quotes. Resp’t IMS Cert. Br. at 13; IMS Health, 
Inc. v. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053, at *6-7, 
n.2 (2d. Cir., Nov. 23, 2010). As described in section
I(B) below, even if they were publishers they would
lack a right to access confidential medical records for
their publication activities. But their analogy
obscures a key difference between their activities
and those of public media outlets: the facts
newspapers report, although sold for payment and
profit, are contributions to the public domain.
Copyright law restricts the copying of the expression
itself, but “does not shield any idea or fact contained
in the copyrighted work;” “[a] reader may make full
use of any fact or idea she acquires from her
reading.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 197, 217
(2003) (internal citations omitted). Such reporting,
therefore, contributes information that the wider
public may use for discussion, commentary, and
3  Even critics of the general notion of data privacy laws 
generally support laws like Vermont’s that serve the 
constitutional value of ensuring a willing speaker by creating 
and enforcing implied contracts that certain kinds of data will 
not be traded without consent, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1049, 1057-62 (2000), and placing conditions on the use or 
transfer of data that the government holds or requires, id. at 
1055. 
10 
broad circulation. Not so with the prescription 
information traded in this case. “Data mining 
appellants actually prohibit their customers from 
disclosing the data they license to anyone else, much 
less the general public.” Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 24053 at *67 (Livingston, J. dissenting, 
emphasis in the original). The Respondents are not 
publishers because they do not deliver their 
information in a manner that can ever enter public 
discourse. And because they are not publishers, the 
higher First Amendment standards applicable to 
publishers do not apply.  Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 
at 762-63. 
It need not be disputed that there are 
occasions when “[e]ven dry information, devoid of 
advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression” 
may be protected by the First Amendment. Sorrell, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at *18-19 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). But the use and trade of 
such information in entirely private settings, as a 
product rather than for any expressive or 
communicative purpose, serves no First Amendment 
value. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at *65-
66 (Livingston,  J. dissenting). As with the restricted 
trade in credit report information at issue in Dun & 
Bradstreet, there “is simply no credible argument” 
that the trade in prescription drug records “requires 
special protection to ensure that debate on public 
issues will be uninhibited, robust and wide open.” 
472 U.S. at 762; see Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52 
(describing the unprotected class of communications 
as deriving “from a felt sense that the underlying 
11 
laws are inoffensive to the core values of the First 
Amendment”). 
Fundamentally, the conduct of the 
Respondents with the personally identified 
information at issue in this case is not speech 
because their commercial trade and use of 
confidential information is deliberately tailored to 
never inform the public sphere. 
B. Prescription Records are Not
Public Information.
The regulated prescription data mining 
activities lack First Amendment protection for an 
additional reason – the records Respondents seek to 
access are not public information.4 Recognition of a 
right to access and use information in such records 
would force patients and doctors to release 
information without their consent and therefore 
would implicate the “freedom not to speak publicly.” 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985); see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n 
of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-98 
(1988).  
Prescription records would not exist but for 
state laws preventing patients from filling 
4  Respondents seek to artificially sever their purchase of the 
data from the pharmacies’ acquisition of the data in their role 
as government-regulated dispensers of controlled substances. 
They dispute that they seek a right “to access” government 
mandated records, describing their claim instead as one “to 
purchase” them. IMS Cert. Pet. at 20. This appears to be a 
distinction without a difference.  
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prescriptions without providing personal 
information. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at 
*58 (Livingston, J. dissenting). It is not disputed
that, had the pharmacists and other holders of
prescription records been government entities, there
would be no right of the Respondents to access those
records over government imposed restrictions.
United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 40; see also Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532, 537 (1989)
(although state could not punish public disclosure of
names of rape victims in public records, it could
prohibit the records from being released); Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (affirming no
right to “sources of information under government
control”); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 496 (1975) (states may regulate “exposure of
private information”). Notably, the validity of such
restrictions holds regardless of whether the
recipients at issue are “publishers.” Id. Even the
public media lacks a First Amendment right to
access confidential information from government
records.
The majority in the Second Circuit held that 
the outcome is different in this case because the 
holders of the information are private entities, not 
offices of government. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
24053 at *22-23. But that distinction was rejected in 
Seattle Times Co., where the Court upheld a 
restriction on the dissemination of information from 
one private party to another “pursuant to a court 
order that both granted him access to that 
information and placed restraints on the way in 





32. The Vermont law similarly grants pharmacies 
and other health care providers access to 
prescription information only with accompanying 
restraints on the purposes for which the information 
can be used.  
 
The Sorrell majority opinion’s distinction 
between the public or private nature of the holder of 
government-mandated information would lead to the 
absurd consequence of requiring, as a matter of 
constitutional law, dramatically different 
confidentiality laws for government-required 
educational, health, prison and other records 
depending on whether the service provider was 
public or private. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
24053 at *59-60 (Livingston, J. dissenting). The 
relevant distinction is not whether the holder of the 
record is part of government but rather whether the 
holder, public or private, is a recipient of the 
information only by virtue of a government 
requirement. Here, pharmacies possess prescription 
records because Vermont law requires them as a 
condition for accessing essential medical care. 
Vermont is therefore free to place secondary 
distribution restrictions on those same records.  
C. Respondents’ Theory Would 
Threaten a Complex Web of State 
and Federal Personal Information 
Privacy  Protections. 
Respondents’ theory that strict scrutiny is 
warranted for any government regulation of the sale 
or use of truthful information or that “discriminates” 





and other speakers, IMS Cert. Br. at 1, 10, 13, would 
threaten a massive amount of regulatory law, 
including every information confidentiality law in 
the nation.  
 
 Every confidentiality protection, from those 
protecting grand jury identities to the many rules 
foreclosing commercial uses of medical, financial, 
and other records, suppress the free flow of true 
information. Vermont’s prescription privacy law is 
similar to a great body of regulations at every level 
of government that restrict secondary uses of 
personal information from marketing and other uses. 
Such laws are particularly prevalent in 
telecommunications, financial services, home 
entertainment, credit reporting, employment, 
medicine, and with respect to government held 
information. Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of United 
States Data Protection 132-34, 229-230, 243-249, 
270-273, 292-295, 317-323, 354-55, 370, 1998 Supp. 
24-35, 35-45 (1996). See also Daniel J. Solove, A 
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 526-30 
(2006); Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, 
Information Privacy Law 715-824 (3rd ed. 2008); 
Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less, supra, at 971-
72.  
 
The distinction Vermont’s law makes between 
the treatment of commercial marketing and other 
uses of prescription data is not unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination. This distinction reflects 
this Court’s doctrine and approval of prior 





tailored to focus its restrictions on the kinds of “uses” 
of private information that the Court has identified 
as “a regulation of conduct,” while avoiding broad 
prohibitions of “disclosure” which the Court has held 
to be a regulation of “pure speech.” Bartnicki, 32 
U.S. at 527-28. The statute is also constructed to 
carefully parallel confidentiality laws previously 
upheld by this Court in United Reporting, 528 U.S. 
at 35 (allowing government mandated records to be 
used for “a scholarly, journalistic, political or 
governmental purpose,” but not “used directly or 
indirectly to sell a product”) and Reno, 528 U.S. at 
148 (upholding under Commerce Clause scrutiny 
prohibition of recipients of regulated information from 
using it for prohibited purposes, including 
“marketing”). Accepting the Respondents’ theory 
would call into question these previously approved 
laws and the great body of restrictions on the 
secondary uses of personal information for 
marketing purposes. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(d) (banning use of financial 
information for “marketing”).   
 
In addition to striking down a host of current 
laws, the Respondents’ proposal would halt the 
development of data privacy standards in the U.S. at 
a time when they are at their infancy. The entire 
field of informational privacy law is relatively new, 
dating from the 1970s and the growth of computer 
technology. Harry Henderson, Privacy in the 
Information Age 117-30 (2006) (listing privacy law 
chronology). The current state of the law in the U.S. 
is “a complex patchwork of laws and regulations, 





rights, and state laws,” A.B.A. Privacy & Computer 
Crime Comm. Section of Sci. & Tech. Law, Int’l 
Guide to Privacy xx (2004), largely focused around 
“narrow rights addressing discreet issues.” Schwartz 
& Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law, supra, at 215. 
There is a sharp contrast between this patchwork of 
laws and the modern reality of life that creates a 
trail of identifiable data connected to everything we 
do and everywhere we go. See Robert O’Harrow, No 
Place to Hide  34-73 (2006); see also Sharona 
Hoffman and Andy Podgursky, Information Security 
of Health Data: Electronic Health Information 
Security and Privacy, in Harboring Data: 
Information Security, Law and the Corporation 
(2009). This state of affairs has led to a vibrant and 
active debate in policy spheres as to what the ideal 
set of information privacy rights should be in our 
modern networked world. See, e.g., Sen. Franken to 
Chair New Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology 
and the Law (Feb. 14, 2011) 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id
=1315; Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: 
Data Security and Personal Information, in Securing 
Privacy in the Internet Age (2008); Daniel J. Solove & 
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 357 (2006); Stanford 
Law Review Symposium on Information Privacy, 52 
Stan. L. Rev. (2000); Mike Hatch, Minn. Attorney 
General, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting 
Sensitive Personal Information From Commercial 
Interests in the 21st Century, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 1458 (2001). A First Amendment right to sell 





transitorily possesses in the course of business would 
foreclose this entire debate. 
 
This case does not require the Court to decide 
on the First Amendment application to the full range 
of data privacy regulations that exist or are being 
pondered by the policy-making branches. The facts of 
this case deal with the much narrower question of 
the ability of governments to regulate the re-use of 
highly personal information produced under 
governmental disclosure mandates. The Court 
should make clear that the First Amendment is not 
implicated when, having mandated the disclosure of 
medical information, the state protects that 
confidential information from non-consensual 
marketing uses.  
 
II. STATES HAVE OVERRIDING 
INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING THE 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PRESCRIPTION 
RECORDS.  
 
Ultimately the determination of every First 
Amendment case involves the application of a 
balancing test and the jurisprudential work is done 
in determining the weights due each side of the 
scale. As argued above, this case does not fit into any 
of the fact patterns that would trigger intermediate 
scrutiny under the traditional commercial speech 
doctrine. To the extent that any commercial speech 
is affected by the law, it must only be afforded 
protection “commensurate with its position in 
relation to other constitutionally protected 





525, 553 (2001). Here, the effect on the speech is 
indirect and it applies only to commercial speech 
that takes place in in-person solicitations. See 
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641-42. Because Vermont has 
carefully tailored its law to regulate only conduct 
related to the trade in medical records rather than 
any speech, its law should be subject to a rational 
basis inquiry. Nonetheless, there is substantial 
evidence in the record that the law serves interests 
of the highest order. These include the 
“Constitutional privacy interest” in safeguarding 
personal information in state-mandated records, 
NASA, 562 U.S.___ (2011)(Slip op. 1), protecting the 
efficacy and efficiency of its public health system 
from undue influence of pharmaceutical marketing, 
and promoting standards of conduct within the 
licensed professions.  
A. Vermont’s Prescription Privacy 
Law Directly Advances Its Interest 
in Protecting Information Privacy. 
Vermont’s law is a medical record 
confidentiality law. As such, the core interest it 
expresses is one in information privacy. This Court 
recently reaffirmed that protecting the privacy of 
information in government mandated records is a 
constitutional interest of governments. NASA v. 
Nelson, 562 U.S. __ (2011)  (Slip op., 19-20). 
Although the Court has not expressly held this 
interest to be a right protected by the Due Process 
Clause, it has clearly affirmed its nature as a high-
order justification for state regulation. See id. 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (Slip op. at 1) (affirming 
interest of governments “to enact those laws, to 
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shape them, and when they think it is appropriate, 
to repeal them”); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06; Nixon 
v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977).
Vermont directly serves the Court’s articulation of at
least two different kinds of information privacy
interests: one, “the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters;” the other, “the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.5
1. Vermont Protects Against the
Disclosure of Personal
Matters.
Vermont serves a vital interest in protecting 
patients from disclosure of their medical records. 
The Respondents claim that there are no patient 
privacy interests in the disclosure of prescription 
records because patient identities are encrypted at 
the pharmacy’s office prior to their transfer to the 
data mining and pharmaceutical marketing firms. 
See Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 45 (describing encryption 
practice). But the encryption of patient names is not 
sufficient to guard the patient’s interest against 
disclosure of personal matters. 
Because medical records contain incredibly 
intimate details of personal life, patients have a 
strong privacy interest in avoiding their disclosure 
5 For scholarship on the autonomy and dignity interest 
underlying informational privacy protections see Solove, 
Taxonomy, supra, at 522, Cohen, supra,  at 1423-28;  Jed 






“[e]ven if there were no possibility that a patient’s 
identity might be learned.” Northwestern Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004). 
In this case, it is not true that patient identities 
cannot be learned.  As the EPIC Amicus Curiae Br. 
explains in detail, it is relatively easy to re-identify 
records with the amount of information that the 
respondents track.   
 
Indeed, the data mining companies do not 
meaningfully de-identify the records at all. They 
encrypt the name of the patient, but attach to each 
an individual identifier to “track the patient over 
time.” Pet. Br. at 7. While names are encrypted, 
patient identifying numbers are permanent, 
allowing information to be linked across multiple 
information sources to build incredibly detailed 
portraits of individual patients, including the date 
and place that every prescription is filled and the 
patient’s age and gender. IMS Health, Inc., v. 
Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (D. Vt. 2009).  IMS 
marketing materials display that they are also able 
to track the “diagnosis,” “ethnicity,” “address” and 
“insurance ID” for millions of patients, which can be 
used to monitor individual patient responses to 
direct to consumer advertising, “all the while 
remaining anonymous to avoid re-identification.” 
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without identifying physician names, this level of 
detail in the tracking of individuals implicates 
patients’ interests in not having their personal 
information disclosed.6  
The patient interest in avoiding disclosure is 
magnified by the linking of patient information with 
physician identifiers. Such linking of information 
allows pharmaceutical marketers to track individual 
patient treatment so that they can respond, to the 
patient’s doctor, to any change in that treatment not 
in accord with the company’s pecuniary interest. Pet. 
Br. at 9. (describing the use of anonymous patient 
data to send marketers email alerts for any shift in a 
patient’s prescription). The Court should affirm that 
protecting against such practices legitimately and 
directly advances the constitutional interest in 
avoiding medical information disclosures articulated 
in Whalen. 429 U.S. 589. 
2. Vermont Protects the
Independence of Prescribing
Decisions.
Vermont’s regulation of the use of prescription 
data for marketing purposes serves a second 
information privacy interest – that of protecting 
“independence in making certain kinds of important 
6  Indeed, the level of patient detail tracked by the Respondents 
appears to violate HIPAA. 45 C.F.R. §164.502(d)(1) (2006) 
(requiring that patient level data be stripped of numerous 
personal identifiers, including “subdivisions smaller than a 





decisions.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. This is a 
core interest of all medical confidentiality laws. We 
protect the confidentiality of the physician-patient 
relationship because we want medical decisions to be 
based solely on the independent judgment of the 
doctor about the best interests of the patient. 
 
Prescription tracking for marketing purposes 
is designed to influence the independence of 
prescribing decisions “to drive profitable brand 
growth.” Jim Carroll & Tanya Foniri, Infuse 
Anonymized Patient-Level Information into the Brand-
Planning Process to Drive Profitable Growth, IMS, 
http://www.imshealth.com/vgn/images/portal/cit_4000
0873/0/38/78187147Brand%20Planning%20Paper.pdf.  
As described more fully below, the social scientific 
evidence is overwhelming that the interests of the 
physician-patient relationship and the pecuniary 
interest of brand growth are frequently at odds.  
Sorrell, 631 F.Supp. 2d at 449-52. The evidence is 
also overwhelming that influence of marketing is 
intruding on the autonomy of decisions as measured 
by adherence to public health clinical guidelines and 
objective appraisals of best evidence. Id. Vermont 
reasonably concluded that such evidence displays 
the presence of undue influence of marketing, which 
is increased with access to confidential prescription 
records, and which harms the independence of 
medical decision making. Responding to such 
implications of confidentiality breaches is an interest 






B. Vermont Directly Advances Its 
Interest in Controlling Undue 
Influence and Misleading 
Communication in Pharmaceutical 
Marketing that Raise Costs, Harm 
Health, and Damage Professional 
Standards. 
1. Prescription Data Mining 
Accelerates and Incentivizes 
Undue Influence and 
Misleading Marketing. 
 
Respondents claim that Vermont’s law must 
be struck down because the legislative findings 
express an intention to respond to an information 
“marketplace” that “is frequently one-sided” and that 
leads “doctors to prescribe drugs based on 
incomplete and biased information.” Sorrell, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at *15 (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). There is some 
question as to whether these findings relate to the 
data privacy provisions at issue or to a section of the 
same law that was later repealed. Amicus Curiae 
NEJM Br. But even if accepted as applying to the 
challenged law, they do no more than articulate 
interests in curbing undue influence and misleading 
commercial speech that the Court has long identified 
as substantial state interests. 
   
Perhaps the key difference between the First 
Amendment’s application to commercial speech 
restrictions and that applied to core speech is that in 





prophylactic measures to control communications 
that may be misleading or deceptive. Va. Pharmacy 
at 772; Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. U.S., 
559 U.S. __ (2010)(Slip op., at 20), Edenfield v. Fane, 
507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993); Ohralik., 436 U.S. at 457-
58; Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of 
Commercial Speech, 48 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 26-34 
(2001). This interest is heightened when the 
communication at issue takes place in the dark – in 
in-person exchanges, Orhalik, 436 U.S. 447 and 
through contracts bound to secrecy, Dun & 
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749. In such settings, the ability 
of the marketplace of ideas to play a cleansing role is 
diminished as is the contribution to public discourse 
the First Amendment seeks to foster. At the same 
time, the opportunity for and potential influence of 
misleading information is increased. For this reason, 
and particularly where there is evidence of the 
occurrence of misleading advertising, the Court has 
recognized an interest of governments to combat 
“undue influence” through “one-sided” presentations 
that “may disserve the individual and societal 
interest . . . in facilitating informed and reliable 
decision making.” Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58, 461. 
These are almost precisely the terms that Vermont 
used in its legislative findings.  
 
Vermont’s legislative findings clearly 
articulate the conclusion that in-person 
pharmaceutical detailing guided by access to 
prescription histories is exerting an undue influence 
on doctors by misleading them as to the true costs 
and risks of medicines. See S. 115, 2007 Leg. Reg. 





mining and detailing “leads to doctors prescribing 
drugs based on incomplete and biased information”); 
(Leg. Finding 7) (data mining and detailing lead to 
an irrational over-prescription of new drugs that “do 
not necessarily provide additional benefits over older 
drugs, but do add costs and as yet unknown side-
effects.”). The District Court similarly found that the 
litigation and legislative history records establish 
that prescription data “amplifies the influence and 
effectiveness of detailing” at convincing doctors to 
shift patients to new treatments that are more 
expensive, but not necessarily more effective, than 
generic equivalents, and that harm patients through 
irrational prescribing and increased risks associated 
with newer medicines.  Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 
451-54.  
 
The evidence of the occurrence of misleading 
speech in pharmaceutical detailing is voluminous. 
One can begin with the steady trend toward 
increasing criminal convictions and civil fines for 
false and misleading marketing. Public Citizen, 
Rapidly Increasing Criminal and Civil Monetary 
Penalties Against the Pharmaceutical Industry: 1991 
to 2010, (Dec. 16, 2010); C. Seth Landefeld and 
Michael Steinman, The Neurontin Legacy – 
Marketing through Misinformation and 
Manipulation, 360 NEJM 103 (2009); Memorandum 
from Henry Waxman, to Democratic Members of the 
Gov’t Reform Committee, on the Marketing of Vioxx to 
Physicians (May 5, 2005). Empirical studies have 
shown that a large number (eleven percent) of 
observed statements by detailers to doctors were 





doctors could detect these false messages. Ayotte, 550 
F.3d at 56, citing Michael Ziegler, et al., The Accuracy 
of Drug Information from Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives, 273 JAMA 1296 (1995).7  
 
That such cases are not mere “bad apple” 
exceptions is evidenced by the numerous empirical 
studies documenting that higher exposure to in-
person detailing measurably increases irrational 
prescribing behavior as measured by adherence to 
clinical guidelines and the best evidence. See David 
Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the 
Protection of Patient Interests, 38 J.L. Med. Ethics 74 
(2010); Geoffrey Anderson, et al., Newly Approved 
Does Not Always Mean New and Improved, 299 JAMA 
1598 (2008); Abigail Caplovitz, Turning Medicine Into 
Snake Oil: How Pharmaceutical Marketers Put 
Patients at Risk, NJPIRG Law & Pol’y Center 5 
(2006); David Blumenthal, Doctors and Drug 
Companies, 251 NEJM 1885 (2004); Puneet 
Manchanda & Elisabeth Hokna, Pharmaceutical 
Innovation and Cost, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & 
Ethics 785, 797-808 (2005) (reviewing studies); 
Michael Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Economic 
Implications of Evidence-Based Prescribing for 
Hypertension: Could Better Care Cost Less, 291 JAMA 
1850, 1854 (2004); Jerry Avorn, Powerful Medicines 
202 (rev. 2005). 
                                            
7   A similarly high occurrence of misleading statements has been 
observed in pharmaceutical marketing publications. Roberto 
Cardarelli, et al., A Cross-Sectional Evidence-Based Review of 
Pharmaceutical Promotional Marketing Brochures and Their 
Underlying Studies: Is What They Tell Us Important and True?, 7 
BMC Fam. Prac. 13 (2006) (finding that the research presented 





The extent of influence of this marketing can be 
further inferred from its frequency and cost. Sorrell, 
631 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (finding that “[c]oincident 
with the phenomenon of ‘data mining,’ 
pharmaceutical industry spending on direct 
marketing has increased exponentially”); Ayotte, 550 
F.3d at 47 (“the average primary care physician 
interacts with no fewer than twenty-eight detailers 
each week and the average specialist interacts with 
fourteen”); Sorrell, 631 F. Supp.2d at 441 (industry 
spends $8 billion a year on direct in-person 
marketing to physicians); Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 56 
(“The fact that the pharmaceutical industry spends 
over $4,000,000,000 annually on detailing bears loud 
witness to its efficacy”); Manchanda, supra, at 785 
(noting that pharmaceutical industry spends more on 
its sales force than any other industry).  
 
Respondents argue that Vermont cannot have 
an interest in combating misleading speech and 
undue influence in pharmaceutical marketing 
because physicians are “highly trained.” IMS Cert. 
Pet. at 22. Although the sophistication of the target 
of marketing is a valid consideration in assessing the 
state’s interest in combating misleading commercial 
speech, it is clear that doctors are highly susceptible 
to misleading pharmaceutical detailing in its present 
setting. Studies show that prescribing doctors 
erroneously discount the effects of marketing on 
their prescribing habits, Ashley Wazana, Physicians 
and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a 
Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 375 (2000); Blumenthal, Doctors 
and Drug Companies, supra; Michael Steinman, et al., 





Medicine Housestaff Towards Pharmaceutical 
Industry Promotions, 110 Am. J. Med. 551 (2001), 
have low awareness of the cost of the medicines they 
prescribe, G. Michael Allan, et al., Physician 
Awareness of Drug Cost, 4 PLOS Medicine 1486 
(2007), generally trust the messages delivered by 
detailers, Melissa Fischer et al., Prescribers and 
Pharmaceutical Representatives: Why Are We Still 
Meeting?, 24 J. Gen. Inter. Med. 795, 797 (2009), and 
are very poor at detecting false and misleading 
messages within sales pitches. Ziegler, supra, at 
1296.  
 
Even if the commercial speech doctrine were 
applied, it would not disable Vermont from acting in 
response to these clear showings of public need. 
2. Prescription Data Mining 
Increases Health Care Costs 
and Hurts Patients. 
  
Undue influence by pharmaceutical marketing 
results in enormous costs to society that states have 
a vital interest in controlling. These costs are 
measured not only in dollars, but in the degradation 
of public health that flows from increased 
prescribing of drugs that are less effective, and 
sometimes harmful, to patients. 
 
The Vermont legislation detailed many of 
these findings in its law. After documenting the 
presence of undue influence of marketing, the 
legislature found that these practices come “at the 





Finding 3) and “contribute[] to the strain on health 
care budgets for individuals as well as health care 
programs”(Leg. Finding 15). These findings are well 
supported in the record. 
 
There is little debate that cost care concerns of 
states are real and substantial. As the district court 
noted, U.S. spending on prescription drugs has been 
increasing at higher rates than inflation over the 
last decade while the number of prescriptions has 
risen far less dramatically. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 
at 449-50, n.12. This evidences the steady shift in 
prescribing toward more expensive medicines which, 
in turn, is driven by the influence of marketing. Id; 
see National Institute for Health Care Management, 
Prescription Drug Expenditures in 2001: Another 
Year of Escalating Costs (revised May 6, 2002); 
NIHCM Foundation, Factors Affecting the Growth of 
Prescription Drug Expenditures, (July 1999) 
available at http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/ 
issuebrief.PDF. 
 
 There are many examples of the successes of 
our super-charged pharmaceutical marketing system 
at shifting massive amounts of prescriptions toward 
newer, more expensive drugs that do not benefit 
patients. One study included in the legislative 
history showed that using highly-marketed branded 
medicines for high blood pressure instead of less 
expensive generic therapies rated as more effective 
by national treatment guidelines increased U.S. 
health costs by $3 billion in 1996. Robert Cardarelli, 
John Licciardone & Lockwood Taylor, A Cross-
Sectional Evidence-Based Review of Pharmaceutical 
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Promotional Marketing Brochures and Their 
Underlying Studies: Is What They Tell Us Important 
and True?, 7 BMC Fam. Prac. 13, 14 (2006). Another 
study found that approximately forty percent of 
Pennsylvania Medicare patients on antihypertensive 
therapy were being prescribed medications at odds 
with clinical guidelines at an additional cost of $1.2 
billion per year when calculated nationally. Fischer, 
supra, 291 JAMA at 1854.  
A similar effect can be seen in the incredible 
marketing push and resultant prescription surge for 
Vioxx, Celebrex, and other COX-2 inhibitors, despite 
the lack of any conclusive medical evidence that they 
were more effective than older pain medications, or 
that the reduction in gastric side effects were 
significant for most patients. Harlan Krumholz, et 
al., What Have We Learnt From Vioxx?,  334 BMJ 
120, 120-123 (2007).  And in the case of Vioxx, 
aggressive marketing using prescriber data helped 
facilitate the widespread adoption of a drug that was 
far more dangerous to patient health than existing 
alternatives or than the company’s marketing 
messages admitted. Id. Overall, the evidence is clear: 
after interactions with sales representatives 
physicians are more likely to prescribe newer and 
more expensive drugs over generic alternatives, even 
when the alternative would be as good or better than 
the more expensive drug. See Wazana, supra, at 373-
380. 
These undue influences harm public health. 
As the district court found, the record demonstrates 





encourages the prescription of newer and 
“potentially more dangerous drugs instead of 
adhering to evidence-based treatment guidelines.” 
Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 453. Cost and public 
health concerns are linked. Patients, especially the 
poor and elderly, often make choices about which 
prescriptions to fill or whether to split pills based on 
the affordability of the medication, Becky 
Briesacher, et al., Patients At-Risk for Cost-Related 
Medication Nonadherence, 22 J. Gen. Internal Med. 
864, 864 (2007), which in turn contributes to higher 
costs on the health system through increased 
hospitalizations and sub-optimal treatment. Michael 
Sokol, et al., Impact of Medication Adherence on 
Hospitalization Risk and Healthcare Cost, 43 Med. 
Care 521, 525-28 (2005).    
3. Physician-Identifiable Data 




Vermont’s law also furthers its “special 
responsibility for maintaining standards among the 
members of licensed professions,” Ohralik, 436 U.S. 
at 460, including among physicians and pharmacists. 
 
Prescriber profiling is used to reinforce 
pecuniary and other relationships between 
physicians and pharmaceutical companies which 
threaten the ethical standards of the profession and 
jeopardize their relations with patients. See Susan 
Chimonas, et al., Physicians and Drug 





Relationship, 22 J. Gen. Intern. Med. 184, 188-89 
(2007); Susan Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations, 
Part 1, 136 Annals of Internal Med. 396, 400 (2002). 
Prescription histories allow marketing 
representatives to identify their best and worst 
prescribers and tailor rewards or pressure 
accordingly. Waxman, supra, at 13  (revealing Merck 
graded doctors from A+ to D based on how reliably 
they prescribed Merck products); Public Citizen, 
Response to FDA Request for Comments on First 
Amendment Issues, Sept. 13, 2002, available at 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=71
99 (detailing the use of prescription data to reward 
doctors for off-label prescribing of Neurontin). Ninety-
four percent of all doctors routinely receive gifts of 
significant value, such as meals and free drug 
samples. Eric Campbell, et al., A National Survey of 
Physician-Industry Relationships, 356 New Eng. J. 
Med. 1742, 1742, 1746 (2007). These gifts are guided 
by access to prescription data, Carl Elliott, The Drug 
Pushers, The  Atlantic,  82, 90-91 (Apr. 2006), and 
create powerful psychological urges to reciprocate, 
Jason Dana &  George Lowenstein, A Social Science 
Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 
JAMA 252, 253 (2003); Dana Katz, et al., All Gifts 
Large and Small, 3 Am. J. Bioethics 39, 39-41 (2003). 
Physicians whose prescribing behavior is especially 
favorable to companies may receive tens, even 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for consultancies 
and lectures each year. Adriane Fugh-Berman & 
Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug 
Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLoS 





Company Payments to Physicians, 297 JAMA 1216, 
1219-20 (2007).  
 
This perversion of the pecuniary incentives in 
medical care debases the medical profession and, as 
the practice becomes more public, breaks the chain 
of trust between doctor and patient. Robert Gibbons, 
et al., A Comparison of Physicians’ and Patients’ 
Attitudes Toward Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts, 13 J. 
Gen. Internal Med. 151, 152-53 (1998); Gardiner 
Harris & Robert Pear, Drug Maker’s Efforts to 
Compete in Lucrative Insulin Market are Under 
Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2006. Vermont has a 
vital interest in setting high standards in the medical 
professions that ensure patient trust and ethical 
dealing by health care providers, including by 
ensuring medical record confidentiality.    
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully 
urge that the judgment below be reversed. 
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